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been the same as previously, $2,700. There was no change in
her rank or grade, working hours or duties. The deductions
were not made because of any inefficiency on her part, but
as a penalty for failing to go to school. Respondents in their
brief contend that there is no penalty involved; but we note
that in the Bulletin issued by the board in September, 1936,
it is recited: 'It was concluded that teachers reaching the
maximum should be stimulated to maintain their professional
proficiency by continued training. To make this effective,
it was agreed that a salary penalty should be imposed upon
those failing to do this within a reasonable length of time.'
(Italics ours.)
"Also, the rule as applied to petitioner is discriminatory.
The evidence shows that high school teachers of English with
as little as ten years of experience were receiving $2,748 per
annum, while petitioner, with twenty-nine years of successful
experience, was, after the reductions, the lowest paid among
such teachers. There was no general reduction of salaries,
the only ones reduced being those of teachers who had not
complied with the 'condition.'
"In Kacsur v. Board of Education, 18 Ca1.2d 586, 592 [116
P.2d 593], the court said:
" 'However, there are limitations on the power of boards
of trustees to change salaries of permanent teachers. One
of the" legal consequences" referred to in the Abraham case,
supra (Abraham v. Sims, 2 Ca1.2d 698 [42 P.2d 1029]), is
that the fixing of salaries must not be discriminatory, arbitrary or unreasonable. The above cited cases all so qualify
the general power of the administrative agencies to fix the
salaries of permanent teachers. Because of this qualification
it necessarily follows that there must be a comparison with
the salaries of other teachers or salaries of previous years.
If this could not be done, the qualification would be meaningless.' (Italics ours.)
"The record there showed that the respondent board attempted to reduce appellants' salaries from $1,600 to $1,325,
practically the minimum allowed by law. No other salaries
were reduced; most of them were raised; and the salary of
a teacher of approximately the same years of service, experience and qualifications remained the same. The court said:
" 'These facts standing alone are sufficient to force the
conclusion that the attempted action of the board was un-
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reasonable and arbitrary. The fact that the salary of a
teacher of like experience and years of service was not reduced is particularly strong in support of appellants' claim
of discrimination. That there must be some degree of uniformity was recently recognized by this court in the case
of Fry v. Board of Education, 17 Ca1.2d 753 [112 P.2d
229]), wherein it is stated at page 757; "It must be conceded
that, within the limits fixed by the School Code, the Board
has discretionary control over the salaries of teachers. (Citing cases.) However, it must also be conceded that the
Legislature had enjoined on such Boards, with reasonable
limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary
for those performing like services with like experience.... " ,
,. And in that case the Supreme Court reversed the finding
of the trial court that the board had not acted arbitrarily.
"We conclude that the rule of the board requiring petitioner to acquire additional college units or suffer areduetion in salary to which she was otherwise entitled was in excess of the powers of the board. The judgment is reversed
and the lower court is directed to issue the writ of mandamus
as prayed."
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed.
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 3,
1944. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

[So F. No. 16951. In Bank. July 5, 1944.]
GLADYS ESCOLA, Respondent, v. COCA COLA BOTTLING
COMPANY OF FRESNO (a Corporation), Appellant.
[1] Negligence - Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Limita.tions of

Doctrine.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply
unless defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing
[1] See 19 Cal.Jur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 135; [2,4] Negligence,
§ 136; [3] Negligence, § 128; [5] Negligence, § 141; [6,7,9] Negligence, § 138; [8] Negligence, § 56; [10] Negligence, § 139.
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the injury and the accident is of such a nature that it ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence by defendant.
Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of InstrumentalitY.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied on
the theory that defendant had control of the instrumentality
causing the injury at the time of the alleged negligent act,
although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff
first proves that the condition of the instrumentality had not
been changed after it left defendant's possession.
Id.-Evidence--Burden of Proof.-In an action against a bottling company for injuries sustained by a restaurant employee
when a bottle of beverage broke in her hand, defendant is
not charged with the duty of showing affirmatively that something happened to the bottle after it left its control or management; the burden is on plaintiff to show that there was
due care during that period and that she handled the bottle
carefully.
Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.-While the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied unless plaintiff has eliminated the possibility that he
was responsible for the accident, a plaintiff suing a bottling
company for injuries resulting from the breaking of a bottle
in her hand need not eliminate every remote possibility of
injury to the bottle after it left defendant's control; the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a reasonable inference that the bottle was not accessible to extraneous harmful forces, and that it was carefully handled by
plaintiff or any third person who may have moved or touched
it.
Id.-Evidence-Su1II.ciency.-In an action against a bottling
company for ,injuries sustained by a restaurant employee
when a bottle of beverage broke in her hand, the evidence
supported a reasonable inference that the bottle was not damaged by any extraneous force after delivery to the restaurant
by defendant.
Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In
order that a restaurant employee, suing a bottling company
for injuries sustained by reason of a bottll, of beverage breaking in her hand, may rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to supply an inference that defendant's negligence was responsible for the defective condition of the bottle at the time
it was delivered to the restaurant, it must appear that bottles
of carbonated liquid are not ordinarily defective without
negligence by the bottling company.
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[7] ld. - Evidence - Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.Where a bottle of beverage breaking in a restaurant' employee's hand was charged with gas under pressure, and the
charging of the bottle was within the exclusive control of
defendant bottling company, an inference of defendant's negligence would arise, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
if the bottle was excessively charged.
~) Id.-Exercise of Care by Bottling Company.-Where an explosion .resulted from a defective beverage bottle containing
a safe pressure, the bottling company would be liable if it
negligently failed to discover such flaw. If the defect were
visible, an inference of negligence would arise from the
company's failure to discover it.
[9] Id.-E·vidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.-In
an action against a bottling company for injuries sustained
by a restaurant employee when a bottle of beverage broke
or exploded in her hand, plaintiff was entitled to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference of defendant's negligence, where the method used by the bottle
maker for testing bottles for defects not apparent to the
eye was almost infallible, where used bottles were filled and
distributed by defendant without again being subjected to
the same tests, and where, regardless of whether the explosion in question was caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the glass, there was a sufficient showing that neither
cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had
been used, defendant having had exclusive control over both
the charging and inspection of the bottles.
[10] Id.-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Rebutting Inference.When a defendant produces evidence to rebut the inference
of negligence which arises on application of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury to' determine whether the inference has beeD dispelled.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. James D. Garibaldi, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from
bursting of bottle of coca cola. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
H. K. Landram for Appellant.
C. Ray Robinson, Willard B. Treadwell, Dean S. Lesher,
Loraine B. Rogers, Belli & Leahy and Melvin M. Belli. for
Respondent.
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GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff, a waitress in a restaurant, was injured when a bottle of Coca Cola broke in her hand. She
:illeged that defendant company, which had bottled and de, livered, the alleged defective bottle to her employer, was negligent in selling "bottles containing said beverage which on
account of excessive pressure of gas or by reason of some
defect in the bottle was dangerous . . . and .likely to explode."
This appeal is from a judgment upon a jury verdict in fa~or
, of plaintiff.
Defendant's driver delivered several cases of Coca Cola to
the restaurant, placing them on the floor, one on top of the
other, under and behind the counter, where they remained
at least thirty-six hours. Immediately before the accident,
plaintiff picked up the top case and set it upon a near-by ice
cream cabinet in front of and about three feet from the refrigerator. She then proceeded to take the bottles from the
case with her right hand, one at a time, and put them into
:the refrigerator. Plaintiff testified that after she had placed
three bottles in the refrigerator and had moved the fourth
bottle about eighteen inches from the case "it exploded in
'. my hand." The bottle broke into two jagged pieces and inflicted a deep five-inch cut, severing blood vessels, nerves and
muscles of the thumb and palm of the hand. Plaintiff further testified that when the bottle exploded, "It made a sound
similar, to an electric light bulb that would have dropped.
It made a loud pop." Plaintiff's employer testified, "I was
about twenty feet from where it actually happened and I
heard the· explosion." A fellow employee, on the opposite
side of the counter, testified that plaintiff "had the bottle,
I should judge, waist high, and I know that it didn't bang
either the case or the door or another bottle . . . when it
POPlJed. It sounded just like II. fruit jar would blow up .... "
The witness further testified that the contents of thc bottle
"flew all over herself and myself and the walls and one thing
and another."
The top portion of the bottle, with the cap, remai-ned in
plaintiff's hand, and the lower portion fell to the floor hut
did not break. The broken bottle was not produced at the
trial, the pieces having been thrown away by an employee
of the restaurant shortly after the accident. Plaintiff, how.ever, described the broken pieces, and a diagram of the bottlc
was made showing the location of the "fracture line" where
the bottle broke in two.
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One of defendant's drivers, called as a wituess by plaintiff,.
testified that he had seen other bottles of Coca Cola in the
past explode and had found broken bottles in thc warehouse
when he took the cases out, but that he did not know what
made them blow up.
Plaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the court
that being unable to show any specific acts of negligence she
relied completely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
does not apply in this case, and that the evidence is insufiicient to support the judgment.
Many jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in cases iuvolving exploding bottles of carbonated beverages. (See PaY'fl,(J
v. Rome Ooca-Oola Bottling 00., 10 Ga.App. 762 [73 S.E.
1087]; StolZe v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520 [271 S:W.
497, 39 A.L.R. 1001] ; Bradley v. Oonway Springs Bottling
00., 154 Kan. 282 [118 P.2d 601] ; Ortego v. Nehi Bottling
Works, 199 La. 599 [6 So.2d 677] ; MacPherson v. Oanada
Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 129 N.J.L. 365 [29 A.2d 868] ; Macres
v. Ooca-Oola Bottling 00., 290 Mich. 567 [287 N.W. 922];
Benkendorfer v. Garrett (Tex. Civ. App.), 143 S.W.2d 1020.)
Other courts for varying reasons have refused to apply tho
doctrine in such cases. (See Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.~d
674 [129 P.2d 485] ; Loebig's GuardJian v. Ooca-Oola Bottling
00., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910] ; Stewart v. Orystal Ooca,
Oola Bottling 00., 50 Ariz. 60 [68 P.2d 952] ; Glaser v. Seitz,
35 Misc. 341 [71 N.Y.S. 942] ; Luciano v. Morgan, 267 App.
Div. 785 [45 N.Y.S.2d 502] ; cf. Berkens v. Denver Ooca-OoZa
Bottling 00., 109 Colo. 140 [122P.2d 884]; Ruffi;n, v. Ooca
Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514 [42 N.E.2d 259] ; Slack v.
Premier-Pabst Corporation,40 Del. 97 [5 A.2d 516] ; Wheeler
v. Laurel Bottling Works, III Miss. 442 [71 So. 743, L.R.A.
1916E 1074] ; Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. Gretes, - - Va. - [27 S.E.2d 925] ; Dau v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284 [66 S.E. 135,
28 L.R.A.N .S. 949].) It would serve no useful purpose to
discuss the reasoning of the foregoing eases in detail, since
the problem is whether under the facts shown in the instant
case the conditions warranting application of the doctrine
have been satisfied.
[1] Res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless (1) defendant had exclusive control of the thing causing the injury
and (2) the accident is of sueh a nature that it ordinarily
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would not occur in the absence of negligence by the defendant. (Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614, 616-617
[140 P.2d 369], and authorities there cited; cf. Hinds v.
Wheadon, 19 Ca1.2d 458, 461 [121 P.2d 724]; Prosser on
Torts [1941], 293-301.)
[2] Many authorities state that the happening of the accident does not speak for itself where it took place some time
after defendant had relinquished control of the instrumentality causing the injury. Under the more logical view, however, the doctrine may be applied upon the theory that d,,fendant had control at the time of the alleged negligent act,
although not at the time of the accident, provided plaintiff
first proves that the condition of the instrumentality had not
been changed after it left the defendant's possession. (See
cases collected in Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 614,
617-618 [140 P.2d 369].) [3] As said in Dunn v. Hoffman Beverage Co., 126 N.J.L. 556 [20 A.2d 352, 354], "defendant is not charged with the duty of showing affirmatively
that something happened to the bottle after it left its control
or management; ... to get to the jury the plaintiff must show
that there was due care during that period. " Plaintiff must
also prove that she handled the bottle carefully. The reason
for this prerequisite is set forth in Prosser on Torts, supra,
at page 300, where the author states: "Allied to the condition of exclusive control in the defendant is that of absence
of any action on the part of the plaintiff contributing to the
accident. Its purpose, of course, is to eliminate the possibil.
ity that it was the plaintiff who was responsible. If the
boiler of a locomotive explodes while the plaintiff engineer
is operating it, the inference of his own negligence is at least
as great as that of the defendant, and res ipsa loquitur will
not apply until he has accounted for his own conduct."
(See, also, Olson v. Whitthorne &7 Swan, 203 Cal. 206, 208·
209 [263 P. 518, 58 A.L.R. 129].) [4] It is not necessary,
of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote possibility of
injury to the bottle after defendant lost control, and the reo
quirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting a rea·
sonable inference that it was not accessible to extraneous
harmful forces and that it was carefully handled by plaintiff
or any third person who may have moved or touched it.
(Cf. Prosser, supra, p. 300.) If such evidence is presented, .
the question become& one for the trier of fact (see, e. g.,
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MacPherson v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 129 N.J.L. 365
[29 A.2d 868, 869]), and, accordingly, the issue should be
submitted to the jury under proper instructions.
In the present case no instructions were requested or given
on this phase of the case, although general instructions upon
res ipsa loquitur were given. Defendant, however, has made
no claim of error with reference thereto on this appeal.
[5] Upon an examination of the record, the evidence appears sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the
bottle here involved was not damaged by any extraneous force
after delivery to the restaurant by defendant. It follows,
therefore, that the bottle was in some manner defective at
the time defendant relinquished control, because sound and
properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully handled.
[6] The next question, then, is whether plaintiff may rely
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to supply an inference
that defendant's negligence was responsible for the defective
condition of the bottle at the time it was delivered to the
restaurant. Under the general rules pertaining to the doc·
trine, as set forth above, it must appear that· bottles of carbonated liquid are not ordinarily defective without negligence by the bottling company. In 1 Shearman and Redfield
on Negligence (rev. ed. 1941), page 153, it is stated that:
"The doctrine . . . requires evidence which shows at least
~he probability that a particular accident could not have
(lccurred without legal wrong by the defendant."
An explosion such as took place here might have been
caused by an excessive internal pressure in a sound bottle,
by a defect in the glass of a bottle containing a safe pressure,
or by a combination of these two possible causes. The question is whether under the evidence there was a probability
that defendant was negligent in any of these respects. If so,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies.
[7] The bottle was admittedly charged with gas under
pressure, and the charging of the bottle was within the exclusive control of defendant. As it isa matter of common
knowledge that an overcharge would not ordinarily result
without negligence, it follows under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur that if the bottle was in fact excessively charged an
inference of defendant's negligence would arise. [8] If
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the explosion resulted from a defective bottle containing a
:;afe pre~sure, the defendant would be liable if it negligently
failed to discover such flaw. If the defect were visible, an
inference of negligence viould arise from the failure of defendant to discover it. Where defects are discoverable, it may
be assumed that they will not ordinarily e:mape detection if a
reasonable inspection is made, and if such a defect is overlooked an inference arises that a proper inspection was not
lap-de. A difficult problem is presented where the defect is
ullknown and consequently might have been one not discovert:ble by a reasonable, practicable insp~tion. In the Honea
case we refused to take judicial notice o't the technical practices and information available to the bottling industry for
finding defects which cannot be seen. In the present case,
however, we are supplied with evidence of the standard methods used for testing bottles.
A chemical engineer for the Owens-Illinois Glass Company
and its Pacific Coast subsidiary, maker of Coca Cola bottles,
explained how glass is manufactured and the methods used
in testing and inspecting bottles. He testified that his company is the largest manufacturer of glass containers in the
United States, and that it uses the standard methods for
testing bottles recommended by the glass containers a~ocia
tion. A pressure test is made by taking a sample from each
mold every three hours-approximately one out of every
GOO bottles-and subjecting the sample to an internal pressure
of 450 pounds per square inch, which is sustained for one
minute. (The normal pressure in Coca Cola bottles is less
than 50 pounds per square inch.) The sample bottles are
also subjected to the standard thermal shock test. The witness stated that these tests are "pretty near" infallible.
[9] It thus appears that there is available to the industry
a commonly-used method of testing bottles for defects not
apparent to the eye, which is almost infallible. Since Coca
Cola bottles are subjected to these tests by the manufacturer,
it is not likely that they contain defects when delivered to
the bottler which are not discoverable by visual inspection.
Both new Dnd used bottles are filled and distributed by defendant. The used bottles are not again subjected to the
tests referred to above, and it may be inferred that defects
not discoverable by visual inspection do not develop in bottles
after they are manufaetured. Obviously, if such defects do
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occur in used bottles there is a duty upon the bottler to make
appropriate tests before they are refilled, and if such tests
are not commercially practicable the bottles should not be
re-used. This would seem to be particularly true where a
charged liquid is placed in the bottle. It follows that II. defect which would make the bottle lIDsound could be discovered by reasonable and practicable tests.
Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion
was caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the glass,
there is a sufficient showing that neither cause would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used. Further,
defendant had exclusive control over both tho charging and
inspection of the bottles. Accordingly, all the requirements
necessary to entitle plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of reI:! ipsa
loquitur to supply an inference of negligence are present.
[10] It is true that defendant presented evidence tending to show that it exercised considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the pressure in the bottles and
by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at several stages during the bottling process. It is well settled,
however, that when a defendant produces evidence to rebut
the inference of negligence which arises upon application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question
of fact for the jury to determine whether the inference ha.<;
been dispelled. (Druzanioh v. Oriley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444
[122 P.2d 53] ; Michener v. HuttO'n, 203 Cal. 604, 610 [265
P. 238, 59 A.L.R. 480].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment, but I believe
the manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out
as the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the
present one. In my opinion it should now be recognized that
a manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to human beings. McPherson v. Buicl. Motor 00., 217 N.Y.
382 [111 N.E. 1050, Ann. Cas. 1916C 440, L.R.A. 1916F 696],
established the principle, recognized by this court, that irrespective of privity of contract, the manufacturer is respon-
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sible for an injury caused by such an article to any person
who comes in lawful contact with it. (Sheward v. Virtue, 20
Ca1.2d 410 [126 P.2d 345] ; Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co.,
1 Cal.2d 229 [34 P.2d 481].) In these cases the source of the
manufacturer's liability was his negligence in the manufacturing process or in the inspection of component parts supplied by others. Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it
will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate Wille hazards
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury
and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business. It is
to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury
they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not
negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for
its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they may strike,
the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer is best situated to afford
such protection.
The injury from a defective product does not become a
matter of indifference because the defect arises from causes
other than the negligence of the manufacturer, such as negHgence of a submanufacturer of a component part whose defects could not be revealed by inspection (see Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal.2d 410 [126 P.2d 345] ; O'Rourke v. Day & Night
Water Heater Co., Ltd., 31 Cal.App.2d 364 [88 P.2d 191] ;
Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292 [181 N.E. 576]), or
unknown causes that even by the device of res ipsa loquitur
cannot be classified as negligence of the manufacturer. The
inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative
showing of proper care. If the evidence against the fae.'t in-
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ferred is "clear, positive, uncontradicted, and of such a nature
that it cannot rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the jury that the nonexistence of the fact has been
established as a matter of law." (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d
457, 461 [126 P.2d 868].) An injured person, however, is
not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or identify
the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with th&
manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In
leaving it to the jury to decide whether the inference has been
dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence
rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly
circuitous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose
what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for
their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not
to fix that responsibility openly.
In the case of foodstuffs, the public policy of the state is
formulated in a criminal statute. Section 26510 of the Health
and Safety Code prohibits the manufacturing, preparing,
compounding, packing, selling, offering for sale, or keeping
for sale, or advertising within the state, of any adulterated
food. Section 26470 declares that food is adulterated when
"it has been produced, prepared, packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have been rendered
diseased, unwholesome or injurious to health." The statute
imposes criminal liability not only if the food is adulterated,
but if its container, which may be a bottle (§ 26451), has any
deleterious substance (§ 26470 (6», or renders the product
injurious to health. (§ 26470 (4». The criminal liability
under the statute attaches without proof of fault, so that the
manufacturer is under the duty of ascertaining whether an
article manufactured by him is safe. (People v. Sohwartz,
28 Cal.App.2d SUpp. 775 [70 P.2d 1017].) Statutes of this
kind result in a strict liability of the manufacturer in tort to
the member of the public injured. (See cases cited in Prosser,
Torts, p. 693, note 69.)
The statute may well be applicable to a bottle whose defects
cause it to explode. In any event it is significant that the
statute imposes criminal liability without fault, reflecting the
public policy of protecting the public from dangerous products placed on the market, irrespective of negligence in their
manufacture. While the Legislature imposes criminal lia-
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bility only with regard to food products and their containers,
there are many other sources of danger. It is to the public
interest to prevent injury to the public from any defective
goods uy the imposition of civil liability generally.
The retailer, even though not equipped to test a product,
is under an absolute liability to his customer, for the implied
warranties of fitness for proposed use and merchantable qual.
ity include a warranty of safety of the product. (Goetten
v. Owl Drug Co., 6 CaL2d 683 [59 P.2d 142] ; Mix v. Ingersoll
Cundy Co., 6 Ca1.2d 674 [59 P.2d 144] ; Oindraux v. Maurice
Mercantile Co., 4 Ca1.2d 206 [47 P.2d 708] ; Jensen Jl..-Berris,
31 Cal.App.2d 537 [88 P.2d 220] ; Ryan v. Progressive Gro~
eery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388 [175 RE. 105; 74 A.L.R. 339];
Race v. Krum, 222 N.Y. 410 [118 N.E. 853, L.R.A. 1918F
1172] .) This warranty is not necessarily a contractual one
(Chamberlain Co. v. Allis·Chalmers etc. Co., 51 CaLApp.2d
(;20, 524 [125 P.2d 113] ; see 1 Williston on Sales, 2d ed.,
§§ 197-201), for public policy requires that the buyer be in·
sured at the seller's expense against injury. (Race v. Krum,
supra; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra; Chapman
v. Ro!}genkamp, 18:,l Ill.App. 117, 121; Ward v. Great Atlan·
tic & Pacific Tea Co., 231 Mass. 90, 94 [120 N.E. 225, 5 A.L.R.
242]; see Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 ~Iinn.L.Rev. 117, 124; Brown, The Liability of
Retail Dealers For Defcctive Food Products, 23 Minn.L.Rev.
585.) The courts recognize, however, that the retailer can·
not bear the burden of this warranty, and allow him to recoup any losses by means of the warranty of safety attending
the wholesaler's or manufacturer's sale to him. (Ward v.
O"eat Atlantic &; Pacific Tea Co., supra; see Waite, Retail
ltesponsibility and J1tdicial Law Making, 34 Mich.L.Rev. 494,
509.) Such a procedure, however, is needlessly circuitous and
engenders wasteful litigation. Much would be gained if the
injured pcrson could base his action directly on the manu·
facturer's warranty.
The liability of the manufacturer to an immediate buyer
injured by a defective product follows without proof of negligence from the implied warranty of safety attending the sale.
Ordinarily, however, the immediate buyer is a dealer who does
not intend to use the product himself, and if the warranty of
safety is to serve the purpose of protecting health and safety
it must give rights to others than the dealer. In the words
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of Judge Cardozo in the McPherson case: "The dealer was
indeed the one person of whom it might be said with some
approach to certainty that by him the car would not be used.
Yet, the defendant would have us say that he W88 the o.ne person whom it was under a legal duty to protect. The law does
not lead us to so inconsequent a solution.' I While the de.
fendant's negligence in the McPherson case made it unnecessary for the court to base liability on warranty, Judge Cardozo's reasoning recognized the injured person as the real
party in interest and effectively disposed of the theory that
the liability of the manufacturer incurred by his warranty
should apply only to the immediate purchaser. It thus paves
the way for a standard of liability that would make the manufacturer guarantee the safety of his product even when there
is no negligence.
This court and many others have extended protection according to such a standard to consumers of food products,
taking the view that the right of a consumer injured by un~
wholesome food does not depend "upon the intricacies of the
law of sales" and that the warranty of the manufacturer ,to
the consumer in absence of privity of contract rests on public
policy. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272,
282 [93 P.2d 799] ; Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 321, 322,
323 [160 C.C.A. 111, L.R.A. 1918D 798] ; Decker & Sons v:
Capps, 139 Tex. 609 [164 S.W.2d 828, 142 A.L.R. 1479] ; see
Perkins, Unwholesome Food As A Source of Liability, 5 Iowa
L.Bull. 6, 86.) Dangers to life and health inhere in other
consumers' goods that are defective and there is no reason to
differentiate them from the dangers of defective food products. (See Bohlen, Studies in Torts, Basis of Affirmative Obligations, American Cases Upon The Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors of Personal Property, 109, 135; Llewellyn,
On Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 Col.L.Rev. 699, 704,
note 14; Prosser, Torts, p. 692.)
In the food products cases the courts have resorted to various fictions to rationalize the extension of the manufacturer'.
warranty to the consumer: that a warranty runs with the
chattel; that the cause of action of the dealer is assigned to
the consumer; that the consumer is a third party beneficiary
of the rnanufacturer's contract with the dealer. They have
also held the manufacturer liable on a mere fiction ofnegH-
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gence: "Practically he must know it [the product] is fi.t,or
bear the consequences if it proves destructive." (Parks v.
O. O. Yost Pie 00., 93 Kan. 334 [144 P. 202, L.R.A. 1915C
179]; see Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons
Other Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 Va.L.Rev. 134.)
Such fictions are not necessary to fix the manufacturer's liability under a warranty if the warranty is severed from the
contract of sale between the dealer and the consumer and
based on the law of torts (Decker & Sons v. Oapps, supra;
Prosser, Torts, p. 689) as a strict liability. (See Green v.
General Petroleum Oorp., 205 Cal. 328 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R.
475J ; McGrath v. Basich Bros. Oonst. 00., 7 Cal.App.2d573
[46 P.2d 981J; Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 Tex.L.
Rev., 399, 403; Feezer, Oapacity To Bear The Loss As A Factor In The Decision Of Oertain Types of Tort Oases, 78 U. of
Pa.L.Rev. 805, 79 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 742 i Carpenter, The Doc.
trine of Green v. General Petroleum Oorp., 5 So.Cal.L.Rev.
263, 271 i Pound, The End of Law As Developed In Legal
Rules And Doctrines, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 195, 233. ) Warranties
are not necessarily rights arising under a contract. An action
on a warranty "was, in its origin, a pure action of tort," and
only late in the historical development of warranties was an
action in assumpsit allowed. (Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 i 4 Williston on Contracts (1936)
§ 970.) " And it is still generally possible where a distinction
of procedure is observed between actions of tort and of contract to frame the declaration for breach of warranty in ,tort. "
(Williston, loco cit'i see Prosser, Warranty On Merchantable
Quality, 27 Minn.L.Rev. 117, 118.) On the basis of the tort
character of an action on a warranty, recovery has been al.
lowed for wrongful death as it could not be in an action for
breach of contract. (Greco V. S. S. Kresge 00., 277 N.Y. 26
[12 N.E.2d 577, 115 A.L.R. 1020J i see Schlick V. New York
Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182 [22 N.Y.S.2d 238J i Prosser, op.
cit., p. 119.) As the court said in Greco V. S. S. Kresge Oo.~su
pra, "Though the action may be brought solely for the breach
of the implied warranty, the breach is a wrongful act, a default, and, in its essential nature, a tort." Even a seller's
express warranty can arise from a noncontractual affirmation
inducing a person to purchase the goods. (Ohamberlain 00.
v. Allis-Ohalmers etc. 00.,51 Cal.App.2d 520 [125 P.2d 113].)
"As an actual agreement to contract is not essential, the obli.

gation of a seller in such a case is one imposed by law as
distmguished from one voluntarily assumed. It may be called
an obligation either on a quasi-contract or quasi.tort, because
remedies appropriate to contract and also to tort are appli.
cable." (1 Williston on Sales, 2d ed. § 197 i see Ballantine,
Classification of ObligaUons, 15 !Il.L.Rev. 310, 325.)
As handicrarts have been replaced by mass production with
its great markets and transportation facilities, the close rela·
tionship between the producer and consumer or a product has
been altered. Manuracturing processes, frequently valuable
secrets, are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken
of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or
skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness ofa prod.
uct, even when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his
erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and
marketing devices such as trade-marks. (See Thomas V. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 [57 Am.Dec. 455] iBaxter V. Ford Motor
00., 168 Wash. 456 [12 P.2d 409, 15P.2d 1118, 88 A.L.R.
521] i Orist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App.Div. 114 [243N.Y.S.
496], affirmed 255 N.Y. 624 [175 N.E. 341J i see also Handler,
False and Misleading Advertising, 39 Yale L.J. 22 i Rogers,
Good Will, Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading (1914) ch. VI,
A Study of The Consumer, p. 65 et seq.; Williston, Liability
For Honest Misrepresentations As Deceit, Negligence Or Warranty,'42 Harv.L.Rev. 733; 18 Cornell L.Q. 445.) Consumers
no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith,
relying on the reputation or the manufacturer or the trade
mark. (See Max Factor ~ 00. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal.2d 446,
463 [55 P.2d 177]; Old Dearborn etc. 00. v. Seagram-Distillers Oorp., 2,99 U.S. 183 [57 S.Ot. 139, 81 L.Ed. 109, 106
A.L.R. 1476] i Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade Mark
Protection, 40 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 818.) Manufacturers have
sought to justify that faith by increasingly high standards of
inspection and a readiness to make good on defective products
by way of replacements and refunds. (See Bogert and Fink,
Business Practices Regarding Warranties In The Sale Of
Goods, 25 m.L.Rev. 400.) The manufacturer's obligation to
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship
between them; it cannot be escaped because the marketing of
a product has become so complicated as to require one or more
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intermediaries. Certainly there is greater reason to impose
liability on the manufacturer than on the retailer who is but
a conduit of a product that he is not himself able to test. (See
Soule, Consumer Protection, 4 Encyclopedia of The Social
Sciences, 282; Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability For Injuries
Caused By His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 Mich.L.
Rev. 1; Llewellyn, Cases And Materials on Sales, 340 et seq.)
The manufacturer's liability should, of course, be defined in
terms of the safety of the produClt in normal and proper use,
and should not extend to injuries that cannot be traced to.
the product as it reached the market.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 3,
1944. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.

[Sac. No. 5616.
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JAMES IRVINE, Appellant, v. RECLAMATION DIS.
TRICT NO. 108 et aI., Respondents.
[Sac. No. 5610. In Bank. July 10, 1944.]

REED J. BEKINS et al., as Trustees etc., Appellants, v.
RECLAMATION DISTRICT NO. 1500 et a1., Reap ondents.
[1&, Ib] Public Securities - Interest - Bonds-After Maturity.Where government bonds are issued which provide for inter.
est, the interest continues after maturity unless there is some
provision in the authorizing statute evincing an intent that
. they should not bear such interest. (Meyer v. City and County
of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 131, 88 P. 722, 10 L.R.A.N.S. 110,
and Bullard v. Riverside County Drainage District, 41 Cal.App.
2d 900, 107 P.2d 929, disapproved.)
[2] Id.-Interest-Bonds-After Maturity.-There is a clear distinction between a government obligation which makes no men.
tion of interest and an obligation, such as a bond, where the
[1] See 21 Cal.Jur. 1051; 43 Am.Jur. 517.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4,5] Public Securities, § 19;
(3] Public Securities, § 1; [6-10] Reclamation, § 86(1).
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authorizing law and the bond itself provide for interest.
Where the statute states that the bond shall bear interest the
only reasonable implication is that it shall continue to bear
interest after maturity.
[3] Id.-Nature and Characteristics.-Government bonds are ordinarily classed with negotiable instruments and can pass freely
from hand to hand. They are the solemn and binding obligation of the government.
[4] Id.-Interest-Bonds-After Maturity.-The interest accruing
after maturity of government bonds which provide for interest
is not accurately speaking, damages, but is rather an implied
part of the basic contract. There is no derogation of sovereign
immunity in applying this principle, or in concluding that Civ.
Code, § 3289, is applicable.
.
[5] Id.-Interest - Coupons-After Maturity.-As distinguished
from interest on the principal of matured government bonds,
there is ordinarily no provision for interest on the interest
coupons at any time, and hence the general rule is applicable
that in~erest will not run against a government obligation unless it is imposed by statute or authorized contract.
[6] Reclamation-Bonds-Interest After Maturity.-Reclamation
bonds issued under Pol. Code, § 3480 (as in existence in 1925),
§ 3480b (formerly § 3480%), which affirmatively specify' that
such a bond shall bear interest until paid, continue to bear interest after maturity, there being nothing in such sections which
evince o.n intent that interest should not continue after maturity.
The elimination from § 3480, by amendment in 1917, of a former
clause that interest did continue on the bonds after maturity,
but that it shall cease unless the bonds are presented and certain conditions exist, evinces the thought that while interest
continues, the restrictions on that continuance are no longer
effective.
[7] Id.-Bonds-Interest Coupons-Interest After Maturity.-Interest coupons attached to reclamation bonds issued under Pol.
Code, § 3480 (as it existed in 1925), do not bear interest after
maturity, as the elimination from that section, by amendment in
1917, of a former clause expressly authorizing interest under
certain conditions only, indicates an intention that coupons
under the amended act shall not bear interest.
[8] Id.-Bonds-Interest After Maturity.-That portion of Pol.
Code, § 3480 (as it existed in 1925), which states that within
90 days before any interest payable date of reclamation district bonds, the treasurer shall estimate the amount of money
necessary to pay the interest and principal maturing on the
[6] See 9 Cal.Jur. 918.

